EXPLORING THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANIMAL LEGAL RIGHTS: TOWARDS A SENTIENCE-INTEREST PRAGMATIC VIEW

Autors/ores

  • Carolina Cecilia Leiva Ilabaca Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17345/rcda3648

Paraules clau:

Persona en sentit jurídic, Drets en sentit jurídic , Estatus jurídic , Animals, Sintiencia, Interessos

Resum

L'antiga afirmació que "només les persones en sentit jurídics poden ser titulars de drets, i ho són perquè són alhora capaços de ser titulars de deures", implica que altres entitats -com els animals no humans- no poden ser titulars de drets en sentit jurídic. Així mateix, és un fet que les diverses propostes, fructíferament aportades per diversos autors per a atribuir drets als animals en sentit jurídic, no han trobat cabuda en la majoria dels ordenaments jurídics. Per tant, per a determinar per què aquesta afirmació segueix fortament arrelada, i per a explicar per què les propostes ofertes per la literatura encara no han aconseguit superar-la, aquest article duu a terme un estudi crític del marc teòric sobre les qüestions de la "personalitat en sentit jurídic" i sobre els "drets en sentit jurídic", analitzant-los i examinant la seva capacitat per a atribuir drets als animals. Per a això, es distingeixen dos enfocaments generals i es comprova la seva capacitat per a superar l'afirmació: d'una banda, el que sosté que "només les persones jurídiques poden ser titulars de drets", identificat com "*Personismo"; i per un altre, el que sosté que "les persones no jurídiques també poden ser titulars de drets", identificat com "no *Personismo". Finalment, basant-se en els resultats de l'examen, i extraient alguns elements crucials de tots dos enfocaments, aquest treball suggereix un nou enteniment, l'"enfocament pragmàtic *sintiencia-interès", una proposta que pretén ser "efectiva des del punt de vista jurídic", això és, teòricament sòlida, així com pragmàticament factible, per a l'adscripció de drets als animals entre els nostres sistemes jurídics actuals.

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Descàrregues

Publicades

2023-12-30

Com citar

Leiva Ilabaca, C. C. (2023). EXPLORING THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANIMAL LEGAL RIGHTS: TOWARDS A SENTIENCE-INTEREST PRAGMATIC VIEW. Revista Catalana De Dret Ambiental, 14(2). https://doi.org/10.17345/rcda3648

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MONOGRÀFIC